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Analyzing argumentative discourse is not an activity exclusively reserved for
scholars in argumentation theory, rhetoric, and language philosophy. The
proposal of this paper is that the faculty of analyzing argument structure is a
basic precondition of understanding one another at all in argumentative
discourse. Based on an examination of televised debate programmes, it is
demonstrated how participants employ quasi-logical schemata to reconstruct
implicit elements in other participants’ argument structure for purposes of
clarification and criticism. This very descriptive approach entrusts, as it were,
the actual argument analysis to the language users themselves.
1. Analysis and Interpretation
Recently, scholars of argumentation have pointed to the need for supplying the
hierarchical approach to argument analysis with a linear approach (van Rees
1994 and Sandvik 1997), an approach that can capture the significance of
sequential ordering of argumentative speech, with regard to subsequent
hierarchisation of the material. Acknowledging this reasonable suggestion, I
would like to point to an important aspect of this discussion: When an analyst
investigates argumentative discourse, what he does is ideally a reflection of
what language users do all the time in order to understand one another.
Seen from a pragmatic point of view, it is evident that linear and hierarchical
approaches (I shall refer to them as analysis and interpretation, respectively) is
also at work in real life conversation: A hearer will need to first decode the
syntax/lexicon and disambiguate the semantics of a given linguistic utterance.
Then he will have to infer the intended meaning. These operations are both
necessary conditions for understanding the speaker utterance, but they are not
individually sufficient conditions for the understanding; they both have to occur
for understanding to evolve out of the speech event. In this way, these two
conversational operations resemble closely the two methodical levels of
analysis and interpretation.
For the present purposes, the decoding of grammar and lexicon is, however,
only peripheral. The central aim of this presentation is to investigate the
inference level of conversational meaning production: how do participants elicit
implicit meaning in other participants’ argumentative utterances?
It is the hypothesis that participants engaged in argumentative exchanges
employ for interpretive strategies in reconstructing and criticizing each other’s
arguments. What I am interested in is the standards or principles involved in
this process. Based on this hypothesis, I assume that participants do in fact
carry out ad-hoc argument analyses, and hence, this investigation is the
argument analysis of argument analyses: the method of investigation poses,
simultaneously, as the object of investigation.
In particular, this paper will discuss the idea that language users employ quasi-
logical forms in making sense of arguments. The assumption is that the
particular genre of argumentative speech activates a limited logic as a
principle for interpretation. By ‘limited logic’ I do not wish to suggest that such a
logic is less coherent or has limited powers of explanation compared to the full,
textbook logic, I only want to suggest that, contrary to textbook logic, the
everyday logic of language is limited by criteria such as relevance and
informativeness1.
Insofar as it can be demonstrated that certain inference forms are being used
for reconstructing the adversary’s arguments, perspectives are promising: the
normative ideal that involves formal standards of reasonableness will find
empirical justification, thus rendering argumentation analysis less vulnerable
(though not immune) to the charge of biased interpretation: if logical forms are
imbedded in the process of reconstructing and criticizing internally in
argumentative discourse, then analysts of argumentation are justified in
employing the same logical forms in external investigations of argumentative
discourse. The ‘rational judge’ is thus rooted not only in philosophy, but also in
empirical practice.
Now, this is a bold proposal, perhaps too bold. Obviously, an analysis
examining the mutual reconstruction of argumentative elements involves an
analyst in its own right, an analyst who will have to be the rational judge of what
reconstructions are reconstructions of, and what criticism is critical of. But this
is a precondition of all investigations, one that we cannot - regrettably - escape
from. At least, in this framework the analyst is removed from the actual
reconstruction effort, which renders the analysis of the specific inference forms
rather more descriptive and less interpretive than in more traditional
approaches.
2. Reconstruction and Criticism
The words protagonist and antagonist are both construed from the Greek noun
agôn, which means ‘battle’ or ‘war’. The ideal of critical discussion, however,
is intrinsically based on the antagonism to warfare, cooperation, the joint effort
at arriving at the truth of a matter by the use of language (assuming that
adherence to ‘The Principle of Communication’ as laid out by van Eemeren
and Grootendorst (1992) is necessarily cooperative in the Gricean sense of
the word (Grice 1975)). But this cooperation is only at work out of sheer
necessity; without it, there would be no meaningful communication. So the
metaphor is probably not altogether inappropriate after all. Even if the
participants rid themselves of all pride and prejudice, and are only committed
to approaching the truth of the current matter, dialectical method dictates that
they take on the roles of advocating converse standpoints, and challenging the
other’s standpoint. So it is not surprising that van Eemeren & Grootendorst
define the functions of protagonist and antagonist in terms of ‘defence’ and
‘attack’, respectively:
The protagonist’s task is to defend [a] point of view (and no other) and the
antagonist’s job is to attack the same point of view (and no other). (van
Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984: 82)
What I want to explore specifically is what kinds of actions in particular
dissociate the role of antagonist from the role of protagonist, and what exactly
does it mean to ‘attack’ a point of view? Are there any regularities in
antagonistic attacks that can be described systematically? A specification of
the definition (ibid.) states that
...the antagonist’s attacks consist in principle of statements calculated to elicit
argumentation in favor of the protagonist’s point of view and ... that
argumentation is then (or may be) called into question. ...the protagonist’s
defenses consist in principle of statements advancing argumentation in favor
of his point of view and in favor of the argumentation attacked.
Evidently, the antagonist can perform two different kinds of speech act, the
further "elicitation" of the protagonist’s argumentation, and the "questioning" of
the elicited argumentation. In this paper, these two functions are called
reconstruction and criticism, respectively. Obviously, not all instances of
elicitation involves an actual reconstruction of the protagonist’s argument.
Elicitation is often realized by questions such as "how do you get to that
conclusion?", or "why do you think so?", etc. But it may also take the form of
questions like "why do you think that p?", and assertions like "when you say
that p, you must assume that q." In the last cases, the antagonist has actually
rephrased something the protagonist has said, and/or produced something
which the protagonist must mean; and that goes beyond the ‘innocent’ asking
for further argumentation, it also involves reconstructing the protagonist’s
argument.
The notions of reconstruction and criticism will be further developed below. For
the moment, however, it will do to simply assume, that three different actions
are involved in discussion: argumentation (by the protagonist), reconstruction
and criticism (by the antagonist).
Assuming that reconstruction and criticism together may provide us with a clue
to the inferential standards as employed by language users, we can phrase the
central question: Do antagonistic reconstruction and criticism provide
evidence that certain inference forms are considered generally valid, and
others generally invalid?
The obvious way to achieve an understanding of peoples’ validity criteria is to
observe what kinds of statements they produce and what their illocutionary
goals are, when they reconstruct other people’s arguments. It appears that
people tend to go through the trouble of inferring other peoples’ reasoning for
two purposes only: for the sake of clarification and for establishing a base for
criticism. As we leave the clarification issue (because it is not typically
antagonistic), it should now be evident that when reconstructions are produced
for the apparent purpose of criticism, what we are dealing with is counter
argumentation (not to be confused with ‘contra-argumentation’ which is a
protagonistic activity cf. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984). In the following
section I will discuss in some more detail what is involved in producing counter
argumentation (a difficulty that arises in connection with calling the
performance of the antagonist a form of argumentation, is that, according to
the definition above, the antagonist can not advance argumentation at all -
without, that is, becoming a protagonist. This difficulty could be overcome by
saying that whenever antagonistic reconstruction and criticism are employed
as premises for a conclusion in a standpoint contrary to the protagonist’s, then
this counter argument is over-all protagonistic while employing antagonistic
strategies in the establishment of the premises. We could say that, if we
wanted to complicate things further, but we don’t, so let’s just use the term
‘counter argumentation’ as a term for antagonistic reconstruction and criticism
- with the mentioned reservation in mind.).
3. Characteristics of counter argument
In the following, I am going to argue that the act of reconstruction can be
subdivided into two different activities: the paraphrasing of (parts of) some
expressed argument on the one hand, and the cogent elicitation of
unexpressed elements in the same argument on the other. Criticism, in turn, is
basically the refutation of parts of the other’s argument, and I propose that such
refutations come in two variants: refutation of substance and refutation of form.
For the purpose of investigating such processes, I introduce a set of terms:
paraphrase and implicatum are reconstruction devices, whereas formal
refutation and factual refutation are critical devices. To illuminate the use of
these terms, let us look at a fictional example:
(1)
Doorman to clubguest:
Sorry Mate, this is members only. I can’t let you in.
Club guest to doorman:
1. OK, you tell me this club is members only (Paraphrase)
2. And you tell me I can’t get in (Paraphrase)
3. I guess you think that I’m not a member, then (Implicatum)
4. Well here’s my member’s card! (Factual refutation)
5. See, what you’re saying simply doesn’t make sense (Formal refutation)
This example is highly manufactured. I give this example in order for all
reconstruction and criticism activities to be present in one and the same
counter-argument. The exchange involves reconstructing the doorman’s line of
reasoning by paraphrasing what he has said (lines 1 and 2), and by eliciting
what he must necessarily assume for that reasoning to be coherent (line 3). It
also involves the refutation of an element in the reconstructed argument (line 4),
and a refutation of the internal coherence of the whole argument (line 5). Such
examples may be useful for explanation, though not for persuasion. We will
have to look at empirical language for that. But before we do so, figure 1
depicts the proposed system of the various strategies associated with the two
argumentative roles, and the ways these strategies are realized in dialogue:
Table 1.
ARGUMENT                        COUNTER ARGUMENT                
Role Protagonist Antagonist
Strategy Construction Reconstruction 
 
Criticism
Realization
Advancing standpoint
Justification
Paraphrase
Implicatum
Factual
Refutation
Formal
Refutation
This categorization entails a systematic dissociation of protagonist and
antagonist in keeping with the definitions of van Eemeren and Grootendorst:
Constructing argument is a protagonistic strategy, whereas the antagonist
counter-argues by reconstructing or criticizing, or both.
An empirical study of the reconstruction strategy displays certain linguistic
regularities: paraphrases are meta-linguistic whereas implicata are results of
the inferential process of implicature2. Consequently, such utterances tend to
be linguistically realized in different ways; these differences are primarily the
denotation of main verbs, and the use of tentative/assertive modality.
Paraphrases are generally marked by meta-linguistic devices such as verbs
denoting communicative actions, like say, claim, state, but also by an invariant
level of modality: on a scale ranging from ‘tentative’ to ‘assertive’, paraphrases
are in the ‘assertive’ end, realized by the absence of modal verbs and other
modal indicators. Conversely, implicata are generally marked by references to
internal cogency, partly by using such verbs as mean, understand, think, etc,
and partly by using modality of varying tentativeness (indicating the likelihood
of the implicature), like the modal verbs must, may, can.
4. Reconstruction and Criticism in a Real Context
It is now time to turn to some empirical argumentative dialogue, in order to
demonstrate the claims I have made about counter argument so far. A brief
word on the context of the data:
The investigation is based on a small corpus of transcriptions developed from
three television debates that preceded the Danish referendum on the
Amsterdam Treaty under the European Union in may 1998. The debates focus
on various issues of the treaty, each debate initiated by a single question like
e.g. "What are the effects of the Amsterdam Treaty with respect to domestic
policies on refugees and immigration?". The format is very simple: two
debaters participate, one for and one against the treaty. The debate is
regulated by a host, and witnessed by a studio audience with no participation
right. Here is an excerpt that can illustrate some of the points made above. The
debate theme is "What are the effects of the Amsterdam Treaty with respect to
eastward expansion of the EU?"3:
(2)
Ant. then you claim that it says in the treaty that only five countries can join
that’s not true you also said yourself that the treaty says nothing about
expansion so both can’t be right what you’re saying is illogical Holger
Prot. No I never said that |[uncl.]|
The antagonist’s turn consists of three types of counter-argumentative
utterances:
1. then you claim that it says in the treaty that only five countries can join
(Paraphrase 1 (PA1))
2. that’s not true (Factual refutation (FA))
3. you also said yourself that the treaty says nothing about expansion
(Paraphrase 2 (PA2))
4. so both can’t be right (Formal refutation 1 (FO1))
5. what you’re saying is illogical (Formal refutation 2 (FO2))
Lines 1 and 3 have verbs denoting expression ("claim", "said") and
pronominal reference to the counterpart ("you", "yourself") as the agency of
these communicative acts. Consequently, we can safely treat them as clear-cut
paraphrases, PA1 and PA2, respectively. Line 2 refutes PA1 directly by
reference to its non-factuality, and hence we treat it as an instance of factual
refutation (FA). Line 4 is treated as a formal refutation (FO1), because it
indicates that the combination of PA1 and PA2 is a contradiction. It is not
considered a factual refutation, because it does not say that the propositions
in question are not right (factually), but that they cannot - both - be right (in any
context imaginable, apparently). Line 5 is considered a further refutation (FO2)
of the form of the reconstructed standpoints in combination. There is no
reconstructed implicatum in this case, and this follows from the fact that,
according to FO1, the combination of PA1 and PA2 constitutes an invalid
form, and implicating a necessary but unexpressed premise presupposes a
valid form as guiding principle. In this instance paraphrasing alone seems to
rule out the existence of a valid form, and consequently there is no rational
base for eliciting further - implicated - premises.
Apparently, FO1 and FO2 relates to a general principle stating that pÙ Ø p is a
logical contradiction: it is not possible that the treaty says nothing about
expansion and that the treaty says something about expansion (namely that
five countries are allowed to join the EU). We could also say that FO1 indicates
that given PA1 and PA2, no rule of inference applies4.
However, we have not yet taken the factual refutation (FA) into account: FA
states that PA1 is false. So apart from criticizing the argument for being invalid
(FO1 and FO2) the counter argument points to the reason for this discrepancy:
one of the premises is false (FA). If this analysis is credible, we may infer that
the counter-argument refers to the principle of contradiction as the external,
rational standard for assessment. PA1 and PA2 cannot both be true, since
they refer respectively to the proposition p and the negation of that proposition
Ø p, so one of them must be false. And, incidentally, the antagonist happens to
know that it is p which is false.
To this reconstruction and criticism, the protagonist replies by saying "No, I
never said that." What he is referring to anaphorically by "that", PA1 or PA2, is
hard to say, as the discussion is cut off at this point, moving on to another
aspect of the discussion. But the protagonist’s reply, denying a paraphrased
statement indicates that there is something more to the analysis of counter
argument: how should we treat the protagonist reply?
5. Dialogical Dynamics: the Negotiated Argument
Evidently, it is necessary to refine our understanding of counter-argument
somewhat: For the present purposes, we deal only indirectly with the
protagonist's initial argument, by looking at the way it is being represented in
the counter argument reconstruction. The representation need not be fair or
adequate, indeed, the argument that it is supposed to be a reconstruction of,
may not have been advanced at all by the protagonist. So it is not at all
uncommon that the protagonist challenges the antagonist's reconstruction. In
such instances, we can say that the reconstruction is being developed
dialogically, as a negotiation between antagonist and protagonist. In other
words, we need to distinguish between three kinds of argument: the original
argument, the reconstructed argument, and the negotiated argument. The
original argument is the defense of a standpoint advanced by the protagonist.
The reconstructed argument is the antagonist’s proposed reconstruction of the
original argument. The negotiated argument is the argument which may be
established in an interactive process, in which the antagonist’s reconstruction
is adjusted the protagonist (The term ‘negotiation’ does not necessarily mean
that the exchange is equal in terms of power and dominance: in many cases,
the adjustments that the protagonist is allowed to make, are being
instrumentalised for further criticism by the antagonist.).
As a general rule, it seems that, in reconstructed arguments, formal refutation
occurs when there is no implicatum, and implicata occur when there is no
formal refutation: the relationship between them seems to be mutually
exclusive. There is an explanation for this: When you implicate that some claim
is a ‘needed’ assumption (in the sense of Ennis (1982)) in order for the
opponent’s argument to be acceptable, you do so by reference to a form you
consider valid. This is essentially the practical application of the principle of
charity (Scriven 1976: 71ff.). But having reconstructed the opponent’s
argument on a valid form, there is obviously no ground for a formal refutation.
Conversely, when paraphrases alone seem to indicate an invalid form having
been used, there can be no implicatum, as implicata (of this sort) are
performed according to an expectation of validity (or a maxim of validity, if you
like). So formal refutations occur only when there are paraphrased indications
of invalidity, or when an implicatum is negated. The implicatum can be negated
by a factual refutation produced by the antagonist, like in the doorman/club
guest example above. But negation may also come about through a
negotiation in which the protagonist comments on the antagonist’s
reconstruction. Such a comment might be the denial of the antagonist’s
implicatum. And when the implicatum - the needed assumption - is denied by
the protagonist, the antagonist can reply by way of formal refutation.
Example (3) is an instance of this mechanism5:
(3)
Ant. Can I just ask you er now you said that the new treaty is going to draw a
line across Europe
Prot. Mm
Ant. Does that m- does that mean that you oppose the inclusion of Poland the
Chzech Republic and so on three four countries in accord with the old treaty?
Prot. No
Ant. But then your argument doesn’t hold
The subject matter of this exchange requires a brief explanation and an
interpretation of the textual manifestation. Firstly, a preceding argument has
established that the protagonist thinks that the new treaty involves the inclusion
of four - and only four - new member states in the EU. Accordingly, we take the
expression "the new treaty" to stand for "the inclusion of four countries".
Secondly, there is tacit agreement about the norm that no one wants a new line
across Europe after the fall of the iron curtain. So, what the antagonist is saying
is that, seeing that no one wants a new line across Europe, and seeing that the
protagonist is of the opinion that including only four new member states will
create such a line, the protagonist is obliged to be against the inclusion of this
limited number of new members under the old treaty, too, and indeed under
any circumstances. Which means that the protagonist’s original argument is
irrelevant to the question of whether or not to ratify the Amsterdam Treaty. In a
rhetorical term, the antagonist accuses the protagonist of committing the
fallacy of ignoratio elenchi - of ignoring the issue.
In terms of counter argumentation, I propose the following analysis:
1. [ the inclusion of only four new member states] is going to draw a line across
Europe (Paraphrase (PA))
1.1 (Affirmation (AF))
2. we should not include [only four new member states] in accord with the old
treaty [either] (Implicatum (IMP))
2.2 (Denial (DEN))
3. your argument doesn’t hold (Formal refutation (FO))
An interpretation of this sequence observes that the counter argument consists
of two reconstructional utterances, a paraphrase in line 1 which is affirmed by
the protagonist in line 1.1, and an implicatum in line 2 which is denied by the
protagonist in line 2.2. So we have a paraphrased utterance negotiated to be
true, and an implicated utterance negotiated to be false. Following this, the
antagonist in line 3 claims that this negotiation of truth values renders the
argument invalid. But what is the argument exactly? According to the
reconstruction, which is displayed in lines 1 and 2 only, the argument is:
Reconstructed argument (antagonist’s version)
The inclusion of only four new member states is going to draw a line across
Europe
So:
We should not include only four new member states.
Interpreted charitably, the premise needed for validating this argument is the
norm that "we do not want a line across Europe", which is not controversial in
this context, it is a trivial premise and thus a reasonable deletion. When we
interpret the reconstructed argument in this way (and I think we can), the
reconstructed argument is in fact valid - it can be assessed according to the
inference form modus tollens, without eliciting unexpressed content which is
wildly controversial.
When we then look at the negotiated version of the same argument (involving
lines 1, 1.1, 2, and 2.2), the conclusion is negated (in line 2.2). So an
assessment of this argument by reference to modus tollens will render it
invalid:
Negotiated argument (protagonist’s version)
The inclusion of only four new member states is going to draw a line across
Europe
So:
We should include only four new member states.
This is why the antagonist formally refutes the negotiated argument (in line 3).
The formal refutation (your argument doesn’t hold) refers to the protagonist’s
refusal of the conclusion of the reconstructed argument: when the conclusion is
refuted, the form is invalid; if not, it is valid, according to the antagonist.
Note that the reconstruction could also be interpreted in the form of modus
ponens, in which case the unexpressed norm (we should not draw a line
across Europe) takes on the role of conclusion. Whichever way the
reconstruction is to be understood, it seems that the antagonist has a strong
case in claiming that the negotiated argument is in fact invalid - to the extent,
that is, that the reconstruction is a fair rendition of the original argument (in fact,
it is not; the protagonist has claimed that the new treaty involves a restriction
which will prevent the remaining Eastern-European countries from inclusion in
the EU for the duration of the treaty. And that does not imply that inclusion of
the four countries in other contexts - e.g. as a first step in a gradual process of
assimilating all eastern-European countries - will "draw a line across Europe".
But this delicate point is lost in the antagonist’s reconstruction.). For the
moment we are content in concluding that the antagonist has successfully
applied a valid argument form (either modus tollens or modus ponens) for the
formal refutation of the protagonist’s argument (at this point, reservations are
probably in order; even if the modus tollens-form employed is of course valid,
nonetheless we have had to interpret the textual material in order to make it fit,
and consequently, we dare only call the form "quasi-logical".).
As we stick to the modus tollens-interpretation, we can further analyse the
mechanism of the negotiated argument as follows:
1. from the antagonist’s paraphrase "if p then q" combined with the
protagonist’s acceptance of this reconstruction, it is negotiated that "if p then
q" is true.
2. from the antagonist’s implicature "not-p" combined with the protagonist’s
denial of this reconstruction, it is negotiated that "not-p" is false, and,
consequently, that "p" is true.
3. based on 1 and 2, the antagonist formally refutes the negotiated argument
on the charge of the fallacy of affirming the antecedent.
If this negotiation is typical (and that still remains to be seen in further analyses
of this kind) we could say that there is a regularity of how negotiation works: in
the negotiation of an argument, the protagonist is allowed to decide what
interpretation is right. After all, it is his argument that is being reconstructed, so
he should know. But the negotiated clarification may then serve as firm ground
for criticism, like in the above example, where the criticism employs the tactics
of a formal refutation of the negotiated argument. The protagonist is moved
into a position in which he faces a destructive dilemma: as the protagonist is
the judge of the correctness of the reconstruction, the subsequent refutation of
the form of the argument is so much more amplified; the antagonist offers the
protagonist an impossible ultimatum: "either we accept your version - but then
your argument is invalid, or else we accept my version - but then your
conclusion runs counter to your general standpoint. Have it your way!"
6. Functional roles in argument
Initially in this paper, stipulatory definitions of the terms ‘protagonist’ and
‘antagonist’, provided a role-based way of isolating counter-argumentation as
an activity performed exclusively by antagonists. This distinction can be
illustrated in a functional model:
Table 2.
PROTAGONIST                                                   ANTAGONIST
(Defending standpoint)                                        (Attacking Standpoint)
assertion                                                               paraphrase
                                                                          <---------------------------------
justification                                                            implicatum
                                                                          <---------------------------------
affirmation or denial
------------------------------>
                                                                               factual refutation
                                                                               formal refutation
So assertion and justification (and in negotiated arguments, affirmation and
denial) are protagonistic activities, whereas paraphrase, implicatum, factual
and formal refutation are discretely antagonistic. In these definitions, the roles
of protagonist and antagonist are functional, as they are activated by particular,
linguistic actions by which they can be identified. The arrows in the model
symbolize the degree of relation to the actual utterances of the counterpart:
paraphrase is directly related to the original argument, as it is (supposedly) a
repetition of an explicit part of the original argument. This is symbolized by a
straight arrow. Implicatum is related to the original argument by virtue of being
(supposedly) consequential of what has been uttered, an inferential
reconstruction of an implicit part of the original argument. The relation is
weaker than in the case of paraphrase, as the implicatum is not directly
verifiable, so this relation is symbolized by a broken arrow. Factual and formal
refutation are not necessarily related to the original argument at all, but need
only relate to the reconstruction (paraphrase and/or implicatum). Hence, no
arrow. On the protagonist side, assertion and justification (constituting the
original argument) is of course unrelated to any later reconstruction or criticism
advanced by the antagonist. Affirmation or denial, however, are direct
comments on reconstruction made by the antagonist, thus symbolized by a
straight arrow.
7. Conclusion
The empirical survey on which these findings are based, is not a scientifically
or statistically valid examination. Rather, it has served as a source of
inspiration for defining central issues of reconstruction practices and to provide
evidence in support of the hypothesis that valid forms of inference play some
role in practical argumentation. Having provided some evidence to that effect,
further work in this area can then proceed: the claim that inference forms are
systematically referred to in argumentative discourse might be investigated in
a larger, and genre-neutral, text corpus. This in turn might provide statistical
data, by which a more substantiated discussion of the concept of counter
argument could be undertaken.
As for the notions of reconstruction and criticism, realized as
paraphrase/implicatum and factual/formal refutation, respectively, we can say
that such notions are useful as they seem to be invariant to context. I believe
that they pertain to any instance of argumentative discourse regardless of
situational parameters. The reconstruction mechanism - paraphrasing and
implicating - is the conversational engine of argumentative dialogue. It clarifies
positions, it problematizes inferences, and it warrants criticism, so that
deadlocked positions may be unlocked and the argument exchange can
progress.
ENDNOTES 
1I have willfully avoided the term 'informal logic' for a variety of reasons: first of
all, the very name seems to me close to being a contradiction in terms.
Secondly, and more importantly, I don't think that the logic of everyday
language is informal (in the sense 'not formal'), rather, some inferential forms
are selected, others discarded for pragmatic reasons. Hence the term 'limited
logic'.
2It should be noted right away that the use of the notion of implicature deviates
somewhat from Grice (1975): Contrary to the Gricean meaning of the word,
implicature in this context is not conceived of a communicational mode which
is necessarily intentional; often what is seen as implicata are not "used
assumptions" but really "needed assumptions" as in Ennis (1982).
3The original passage reads:
Ant. du pastar at der sa star i traktaten at der kun kan komme fem med det
passer ikke du har jo ogsa selv sagt der star ikke noget i traktaten om
udvidelse sa begge dele kan ikke vaere rigtigt det er ulogisk det du siger
Holger
Prot. nej det har jeg ikke sagt |[ukl.]|
4In traditional logic it is accepted that anything follows from a contradiction (Ex
Falso Quodlibet). This is hardly the case in the limited logic of everyday
discourse, where I find it more likely that the expectation of relevance will entail
that no conclusion can follow logically from a contradiction.
5The original passage reads:
Ant. ma jeg lige sporge dig oh nu sagde du at oh den nye traktat vil lave et skel
i Europa
Prot. mh
Ant. vil det s- vil det sige du er modstander af at Polen Tjekkiet og sa videre tre
fire lande bliver optaget i den gamle traktat
Prot. nej
Ant. sa holder dit argument jo heller ikke
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